This paper empirically examines the role of social networks in welfare participation. Social theorists from across the political spectrum have argued that network e ects have given rise to a culture of poverty. Empirical work, however, has found it di cult to distinguish the e ect of networks from unobservable characteristics of individuals and areas. We use data on language spoken to better infer an individual's network within an area. Individuals who are surrounded by others speaking their language have a larger pool of available contacts. Moreover, the network in uence of this pool will depend on their welfare knowledge. We, therefore, focus on the di erential e ect of increased contact availability: does being surrounded by others who speak the same language increase welfare use more for individuals from high welfare using language groups? The results strongly con rm the importance of networks in welfare participation.
Introduction
Extreme segregation of the poor in the United States has sparked a wave of theories about the disadvantaged. Many social scientists now argue that a culture has developed in which poverty reinforces itself through social networks. 1 disadvantaged, networks can inhibit upward mobility. Contacts may supply more information about welfare eligibility than job availability. They may provide negative peer pressure rather than positive role models. This paper empirically investigates the importance of social networks in welfare use.
While the e ect of social networks on individual behavior has long been emphasized by sociologists, economists have only recently become interested in the e ects of social pressure and information spillovers. 2 Game theorists have studied the importance of learning from neighbors and information spillovers in the emergence of equilibrium. Macroeconomists have stressed the importance of human capital spillovers as determinants of growth and inequality. Labor and Public economists have used stigma and informational spillovers to explain a range of outcomes including program participation, fertility, crime and education. 3 Empirical work, however, has found it di cult to demonstrate network e ects. The existing empirical work reveals that many individual outcomes are indeed positively correlated with friends', neighbors', and ethnic group's outcomes. Such correlations have been demonstrated for many v ariables, including crime, drug use, single motherhood, and educational attainment. While suggestive of network e ects, these correlations may result from unobserved factors about individuals, neighborhoods, and ethnic groups. For example, some areas may have better schools, making both individuals and their neighbors less likely to use welfare.
In this paper, we use language spoken at home to proxy for the social links between individuals within a neighborhood. Ample evidence suggests that people in the U.S. who speak a non-English language at home interact mainly with others who speak that language. 4 Therefore, individuals 2 Granovetter 1985 is an example of a sociologist who discusses the importance of embedding individual behavior into social structure. 3 See Banerjee1992, Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch1992, Bulow and Klemperer 1994 and Ellison and Fudenberg1993,1995 for examples of work on information cascades and social learning. B enabou1996, Lucas1988 and Romer1986 are examples from the literature on growth and inequality e ects of human capital spillovers. Besley and Coate 1992 , Borjas 1992 , 1994 , Case and Katz 1991 , Mo tt 1983 and Nechyba 1996 are examples from the Labor and Public Economics literature.
living in an area with more people speaking their language will have a larger pool of available contacts. We use the number of people in one's local area that speak one's language to measure the quantity" of networks, or contact availability. Contacts drawn from high welfare using groups will likely exert a stronger in uence on welfare recipiency. Therefore, welfare use of the language group provides a measure of network quality". 5 We focus on the di erential e ect of increased contact availability across language groups: does being surrounded by one's language group increase welfare recipiency more for individuals from high welfare using language groups? 6 A simple example illustrates our approach. Imagine that an American migrates to Belgium.
In order to take advantage of the generous Belgian welfare system, she would need help in understanding the rules and procedures. As the number of English speakers in her area increases, so too does the number of people who could potentially help her. Moreover, the familiarity that English speakers have with welfare a ects the kind of help they could provide. At one extreme, if the English speakers all shunned welfare and were quite unfamiliar with it, they may e v en discourage her from participating. At the other extreme, if they all knew a great deal about it, this may actively encourage her to participate. Therefore, the return", in terms of welfare participation, to being surrounded by English speakers rises with the familiarity English speakers have o f w elfare. This is the heart of our test. We focus on the interaction term between the number of people in one's area speaking one's language and the mean welfare use of one's language group in the whole country.
We implement our test using data from the 1990 United States Census 5 Public Use Micro Sample, which provides information on language spoken at home, welfare recipiency as well as detailed geographic and individual information. Using a variety of speci cations and samples, we who are more connected to their ethnic community are much more likely to speak that language. Bakalian 1993 asks foreign-born American-Armenians to list their three best friends. She nds that 71 of them list at least one Armenian, and 35:6 list all Armenians. Asked about their other friends, more than 78 of them said that more than half were Armenian. As expected, these numbers are lower for second and later generation immigrants. 5 By language group we mean all individuals in the US who speak that language at home. 6 As we discuss later, focusing on this interaction term controls for any xed di erences between individuals with high and low contact availability.
consistently nd strong evidence for network e ects. Because several aspects of networks are not included for example, neighborhood e ects are eliminated by the xed e ects, our estimates may underestimate the true network e ects. Nevertheless, the network e ects we nd are economically signi cant in size.
Can our ndings be explained by factors other than networks? Since contact with one's language group is itself a choice variable, omitted variable biases may again arise. Our methodology allows us to control for local area xed e ects, language group xed e ects and since we focus on the interaction term the direct e ect of contact availability. This eliminates many of the standard omitted variable biases, such as di erences in leniency of welfare o ces between areas, quality of local schools, di erences in prejudice faced by di erent language groups, and omitted characteristics of people who choose to self-segregate, i.e. live in high contact availability areas.
We investigate any remaining omitted variable biases by i instrumenting and ii dropping controls. Individuals living in a metropolitan area containing few of their language group will nd it much more di cult to self-segregate. Therefore, the numberof one's language group in one's metropolitan area provides a potential instrument. If self-segregation caused our results, then we would expect the coe cient to fall when we instrument. In contrast, the point estimate hardly changes. 7 In fact, our calculations indicate that self-segregation between MSAs must begreater than self-segregation within MSAs for it to explain our results. In a similar vein, we i n vestigate the e ect of dropping important controls. Suppose selection on unobserved characteristics is similar to selection on observed ones. Then the change in coe cients when we drop controls provides information about the importance and sign of the omitted variable bias. When we perform this exercise by dropping the education dummies, we nd that the coe cients do not change. 8 Both of 7 Moving within metropolitan areas is much easier than moving between them. We, therefore, expect more sorting within metropolitan areas than between them. The reduced endogeneity implies that instrumenting with MSA contact availability will reduce any bias caused by c hoice of where to live. The di erence between the OLS and IV estimates provides information about the sign and size of this bias. these techniques have previously been used by researchers to argue against the existing evidence for network e ects. For example, Evans, Oates and Schwab 1992 instrument for neighborhood outcomes with metropolitan characteristics. They nd that this eliminates the strong positive correlation between individual and neighborhood outcomes. Similarly, many have pointed out that adding education or other important controls signi cantly reduces estimated network e ects. 9 Therefore, nding that our results are robust to these criticisms con rms the importance of looking within neighborhoods to disentangle network e ects from unobservable factors.
10
The main contribution of this paper is that it circumvents many of the omitted variable biases that typically plague estimates of network e ects. Using language and geography to proxy for social networks generates variation within local areas and language groups, allowing us to include both local area and language group xed e ects. By measuring networks as the interaction of the quality of contacts and the quantity of contacts, we can control for the direct e ects of quality and quantity. Finally, we investigate any remaining omitted variable biases by instrumenting and exploring selection on observables. We believe that these innovations represent signi cant progress on the di cult problem of distinguishing network e ects from unobserved di erences between individuals, areas and groups.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the empirical strategy.
The data is described in section 3. In section 4, we present the results and speci cation checks.
Section 5 concludes.
areas based on observables. However, we nd no systematic support for di erential selection on the basis of the mean welfare use of the language group. 9 Murphy and Topel 1990 have made this argument in the literature on inter-industry wage di erentials. They note that the removal of marital status and other controls in ates estimated industry wage di erentials signi cantly, and use this evidence to argue that the estimated di erentials are largely driven by omitted variable biases.
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In section 4.8, we discuss the possibility that a bureaucratic channel, rather than network e ects, drive our results. Welfare o ces may better serve the needs of non-English speakers when many such people use welfare. To i n vestigate this possibility, w e look at ethnic variation within language group, which allows us to control for any bureaucratic externalities. We nd qualitatively similar results despite these controls. Much of the previous literature used mean neighborhoodcharacteristics to proxy for networks.
11
This implicitly assumes that contacts are randomly distributed within the neighborhood. In this framework, one would estimate: P r W e l f ij = W e l f j + X i + ij 1 where W e l f j represents mean neighborhood welfare recipiency and X i are observed individual characteristics. This regression su ers from two similar omitted variable biases. 1 Omitted personal characteristics may be correlated with W e l f j . For example, individuals living in bad 11 Jencks and Mayer 1990 present a thorough survey of this literature. Papers have estimated neighborhood e ects for a variety of socioeconomic variables, including crime, drug use, sexual behavior, and educational attainment. Most papers tend to nd a strong correlation between individual and mean neighborhood outcomes.
areas may be less ambitious. 2 Omitted neighborhoodcharacteristics may be correlated with W e l f j . For example, neighborhoods with a lenient welfare o ce may increase an individual's probability o f welfare use as well as the mean welfare use in the area. More generally, this raises a simultaneity problem since any shocks a ecting the whole neighborhood's welfare use will result in a positive^ .
12
Both these biases are likely positive, resulting in an overestimate of . Thus, nding a positive^ cannot be interpreted as evidence of networks.
Even randomized experiments may not solve these problems. In the Gautreaux experiment, individuals were assigned to neighborhoods in Chicago. Rosenbaum 1995 contends that this assignment w as in essence random. Even if one believes this, the randomization does not account for omitted neighborhoodcharacteristics. Rosenbaum nds that women allocated to better neighborhoods experience better outcomes. This, however, does not provide unbiased evidence for networks since these neighborhoodsmay be closer to jobs, have more lenient w elfare o ces or provide better schooling. While Rosenbaum provides useful evidence about the importance of neighborhood e ects, it is hard to learn about networks from his paper. Borjas 1992 Borjas ,1995 has investigated network e ects using a di erent approach. First, rather than being determined by geographical proximity, he assumes networks are based on ethnic similarity.
In essence, he uses mean outcomes in the ethnic group to measure Netw ijk . Second, he is primarily interested in the e ect of previous generation's outcomes on the current generation's. He refers to the average quality of the ethnic group in the previous generation as ethnic capital Borjas, 1992. To i n vestigate the e ect of ethnic capital in the context of welfare use, one can imagine estimating 12 Case and Katz 1991 circumvent this simultaneity problem by instrumenting for mean peer behavior with parental background variables of the teenagers in the neighborhood. the following regression: 13 P r W e l f ijk = W e l f ,1k + X i + Y j + Z k + ijk 2 where W e l f ,1k is the mean welfare recipiency of the ethnic group in the previous generation and Z k are observed language group characteristics. This regression also su ers from two omitted variable biases. 1 Omitted personal characteristics may be correlated with W e l f ,1k . 14 2 Omitted ethnic group characteristics may be correlated with W e l f ,1k . For example, ethnic groups facing higher levels of discrimination may need to rely more an welfare. Again, these biases are positive, making it hard to draw rm inferences about networks from^ .
Our approach expands both the work on neighborhood e ects and ethnicity: we use geographic and ethnic variation. One advantage of combining the two approaches can easily beseen in the two previous equations. In equation 1, one can include ethnic xed e ects, while in equation 2, one can include neighborhood xed e ects.
15
A regression that exploits both the ethnic and geographic dimensions of networks, therefore, allows the inclusion of both neighborhood and ethnic xed e ects. This deals with two biases mentioned above: omitted neighborhood and ethnic group characteristics.
Moreover, unlike Borjas, we use language rather than ancestry as our measure of ethnicity".
Since ancestry can often include individuals more loosely connected to their ethnic group, we feel 13 Borjas and Hilton 1996 estimate a more complex version of this equation. They study whether the type of bene ts received by earlier immigrant w aves in uence the types of bene ts received by newly arrived immigrants" italics added. They nd that participation in a speci c program is correlated with mean participation in that program for the earlier wave, even after controlling for global mean welfare use of the previous wave. This hints at ethnic networks transmitting information about welfare programs. 14 In Borjas's papers, this problem is less severe since many of the omitted characteristics are actually part of his story. For example, groups with higher ethnic capital may transmit more potentially unobserved skills to successive generations, and this is one mechanism by which ethnic capital operates. 15 Borjas 1995 investigates the e ect of adding tract level neighborhood xed e ects to an ethnic capital regression. He nds that the coe cient drops signi cantly when neighborhood xed e ects are added. Combined with the evidence he presents on segregation of ethnic groups, he concludes that this provides evidence that ethnic capital acts through neighborhoods. With respect to local networks, the results of this paper are harder to interpret. Since he uses tract level data, he has approximately 26 people in each tract. Once one focuses on ethnics, this number becomes quite small, making it hard to compute local contact availability measures with any degree of accuracy.
language provides a more precise measure of social links. 16 We measure Netw ijk using the number of people the individual interacts with in combination with the attitudes and knowledge of those people towards welfare. Thus our network measure includes quantity" and quality" of contacts.
If interactions occur mainly within language groups, we can write: The number of people from language group k living in area j measures contact availability, denoted by C A jk , or sometimes C Afor simplicity.
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This is our quantity" measure. The above formula suggests that we proxy the knowledge and attitudes of others from language group k in area j with the mean welfare use of language group k in area j excluding individual i, which w e refer to as W e l f ,ij k . Because W e l f ,ij k may re ect unobserved characteristics that an individual has in common with people from the same language group living in the same area, it can introduce an omitted variable bias. To a void this, we replace W e l f ,ij k by W e l f k , the mean welfare use of the whole language group in the United States. 18 We, therefore, estimate:
19 W e l f ijk = C A jk W e l f k + X i + j + k + C A jk + ijk 3 where j and k are xed e ects for local areas and language groups. As noted above, C A jk is a measure of the quantity" of contacts available, and W e l f k is a measure of the quality" of contacts: it proxies for the knowledge and attitudes of individuals from one's language group in 16 Lazear 1995 provides an interesting analysis of the determinants of language use by immigrant groups.
In the empirical section we will measure C A jk slightly di erently. Instead of simply taking the proportion of neighbors who speak the language, we will take the proportion and then divide by the proportion in the entire U.S. that speaks the language. Our results are insensitive to this choice, but the alternative measure has several nice properties. For example, it equals one if people are distributed uniformly.
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We do not use W e l f ,ik , the mean welfare use of the whole language group minus individual i, because, given sample sizes, removing any one individual does not a ect the overall mean.
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Though W e l f ijk is a binary variable, we estimate a linear probability model instead of a probit or logit because probits and logits become computationally infeasible in the presence of about 1200 area xed e ects. As a speci cation check, we do estimate probit and logit models without the xed e ects see We measure the size of social networks by contact availability C A . C A jk is the proportion of people in area j that belong to language group k divided by the proportion of people in the U.S. from that language group.
22
In most speci cations we use the log of this ratio.
23
Hence, the contact availability measure is de ned as:
where C jk is the numberof people in area j that belong to language group k, A j is the number of people that live in area j, L k is the total number of people in the U.S. that belong to language group k, and T is the total number of people in the U.S.
We divide by the language group's proportion in the U.S. because it instills the measure with several nice properties. For example, if individuals are uniformly distributed across areas, the 20
There is a 1970 Census 1 PUMS which matches individuals by tracts and provides information about that tract matched from the 15 Census. We did not use that data for two reasons. First, in the 1 sample, our sample size would be only 1=5 as large. Second the 1 match does not provide us with matched language or even ethnic breakdowns. We w ould be forced to compute our measures from within the 1 sample. Since each tract has approximately 26 people, and most of these speak only English, the resulting measures would be very noisy. See Borjas 1995 for details. 21 It would also be nice to have information about other speakers of a language, e.g. second generation immigrants who only speak English at home but are still conversant in the home tongue. Of course, since these people are less likely to have strong ties to their ethnic group, this omission is likely not too serious.
22
Areas are either PUMAs or MSAs. 23 We extensively check the robustness of our results to the choice of this measure. See section 4.3. measure would equal one for all people. The results are insensitive to this division. 25 The sample used in the regressions is a subset of the sample used to construct the contact availability measures. First, we restrict the sample to non-English speakers.
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Toomany people speak only English for that language tobeagoodproxy of the size of an English speaker's social network. Second, we restrict the sample to language groups that have more than 2,000 people sampled in the 5 PUMS, which represents 400,000 people in the United States.
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The rationale for this is to drop language groups that are so small that the sampling error for the concentration measure at the PUMA-level would be high. Third, we restrict the sample to women between the ages of 15 and 55. We do not include older women since some of their measured welfare participation would actually be recipiency of Supplemental Security Income SSI. We test the sensitivity of these sample selection criteria in Section 4.3.
The variable welfare use" is a dummy v ariable that equals one if the individual received any income from public assistance other than Social Security income. The Census does not ask more precise questions about the type of public assistance received. The variable welfare use" includes more than just Aid to Families with Dependent Children AFDC, because it also includes public assistance such as General Assistance and Heating Assistance. However, in-kind bene ts such as provided by the Food Stamps program and the Women, Infants and Children WIC program might not have been reported as income from public assistance. Whenever we refer to welfare" we mean all forms of public assistance as measured by the variable welfare use". Our measure of mean welfare use by language group is based on the women in the sample at this point.
In the end, we obtain 42 language groups, 271 MSAs, 1, 196 PUMAs, 22, Or zero, once we take logs.
25
In the log formulation, dividing by the language group's proportion in the U.S. does not a ect the results since the divisor is absorbed by the language group xed e ects. Table 1 summarizes the main variables. The women in our sample resemble the average U.S.
Summary Statistics
women of the same age except in three respects. First, 5:8 of the women in our sample receive welfare whereas this gure is only 4:7 for the U.S. average. Second, the women in our sample have had less education on average. Especially striking is that the percentage of women without a high school degree is about twice as high 40 versus 22.
28
Finally, our sample has a higher fraction of people who are neither white nor black. Cross tabulations not presented indicate that a substantial numberofwomen who are not single mothers still receive w elfare. This con rms that our welfare measure is not just measuring AFDC participation but also other forms of welfare.
In Table 2 , we give selected summary statistics for each of the 42 language groups. The most striking fact is that more than 50 of our sample speak Spanish.
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The remaining languages come from many areas. European Eastern and Western, South Asian, Far Eastern, and Middle Eastern languages are all represented. There is also one African Kru and one Native American Navajo language group in our sample.
The language groups exhibit large variation in mean welfare participation. The lowest is Gujarathi speakers with only :5 percent of the Gujarathi women in our sample receiving welfare.
Consistent with the low w elfare use, they also have one of the highest marriage rates in our sample.
Miao and Mon-Kmer speakers, on the other hand, have the highest levels of welfare recipiency.
28
This raises concerns that our four education dummies do not capture enough of the variation in education level. Hence, we also replaced the 4 education dummies by a ner partition of 7 education groups. More speci cally, w e split the high school dropouts in 4 di erent groups: less than rst grade, 1st to 4th grade, 5th to 8th grade and 9th to 12th grade without diploma. The results were unchanged.
29
In Table 6 , we i n vestigate the e ects of excluding Spanish speakers from our regressions.
Around 30 of these women use welfare. They are also characterized by extremely high numbers of high school dropouts and tend to be younger.
30
The next highest welfare use is by the Armenian and Vietnamese speakers. Members of these four language groups are more likely to berefugees, which partly explains their high level of welfare recipiency.
Empirical Results

Di erences-in-Di erences
Before discussing the basic results, it is useful to present a simple di erences-in-di erences calculation. Suppose we split people into two groups: those from language groups with above and those from language groups with below median welfare use. We can also split people on the basis of contact availability: those with above and those with below median contact availability. The interaction of these two splits yields four groups. An individual may be from a high or low w elfare using group and live in a high or low contact availability area. Our empirical strategy in this case translates into a di erences-in-di erences estimation. In this simpli cation, taking the di erence between low and high welfare groups is the analogue of using language xed e ects. Similarly, the control for contact availability becomes the di erence between low and high contact availability.
Finally, the interaction term becomes the di erence of these di erences. Table 3 displays the di s-in-di s calculation for our data. Each panel contains nine numbers.
Consider rst Panels A and B. The rst two columns and rows represent the mean of the dependent variable. For example, Panel A tells us that the mean welfare use of the low contact availability and low w elfare group is 2:05 percent. The third row contains column by column di erences of the rst two r o ws. Similarly, the third column contains row b y r o w di erences of the rst two columns.
For example, Panel A shows that the di erence between living in a high CA area and a low CA 30 We i n vestigate the e ects of dropping these two groups in Table 6 . area is 2:84 percentage points for the high welfare group. The entry in the third column and row represents the di s-in-di s calculation. Standard errors are in parentheses.
In Panel A, contact availability is measured at the PUMA level whereas it is measured at the MSA level in Panel B. All estimates show a positive and signi cant e ect for the di s-in-di s calculation. This illustrates that contact availability raises welfare use more for high welfare using language groups. Focusing on Panel A, we see that the di erence between a high and low CA area is :0021 percentage points for a low w elfare group, while it is :0284 for a high welfare group. These two numbers are di erent by an order of magnitude. A similarly large di erence is seen in Panel B. Table 4 displays the main results. We estimate a linear probability model for welfare recipiency in which the right hand side includes xed e ects for each language group, xed e ects for each PUMA, demographic controls, a measure of contact availability CA, and the interaction of CA 31 We also ran the di s-in-di s with demographic controls and PUMA xed e ects. This raised the di s-in-di s estimate to 0.0406 Standard Error: .0059 for the PUMA level speci cation and to 0.02406 Standard Error: .0107 for the MSA level speci cation. The demographic controls consist of 3 race dummies, a quadratic in age, 4 education dummies, 6 marital status dummies, a control for the numberofchildren born, a dummy for the presence of a child at home and a dummy for single motherhood. In Section 4.2, we discuss the choice of these controls. The demographic controls include 4 education dummies, age, age squared, 3 race dummies, 6 marital status dummies, a dummy for single motherhood, a dummy for the presence of own children at home as well as a control for the numberofchildren ever born.
Basic Results
34
The rst three sets of controls|race, education and age|clearly belong in the equations. The second set of controls| marital status, fertility and single motherhood|are more endogenous. Networks may also a ect welfare participation by a ecting these variables. For example, women may be more likely to take up AFDC if networks increase the probability of single motherhood. Nevertheless, we include these variables as covariates, since they may also control for unobserved characteristics of individuals.
Including them in the regression can only lead us to underestimate the e ect of networks. Therefore, nding evidence of networks in spite of controlling for these variables, only strengthens our case.
In Table 4 , the covariates display the expected signs. Higher education and being non-black decreases probability of welfare use. Being single, having more kids, and being a single mother all increase probability o f w elfare use. Because of the quadratic term, age has a positive e ect on welfare use for women under 35, and a negative e ect for women over 35.
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The negative e ect of 33 When we examined uncorrected standard errors not shown, they were smaller, indicating that there is some correlation within language-area cells.
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The six marital dummies are married with spouse present, married with spouse absent, widowed, divorced, separated, never married. In the regressions, the omitted variable is married with spouse present. The four education dummies are high school dropout, high school graduate, some college and college and beyond. In the regressions, the omitted variable is college and beyond. The three race dummies are black, white and other, with other omitted from regressions.
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The positive e ect of age for women under 35 is slightly puzzling since we are controlling for numberofchildren and children present. One would expect that if two individuals have had the same numberof children, the younger one should be more likely to use welfare.
having a child present is the only anomaly. However, the sum of the coe cients on child present and numberofchildren present is positive ,:0043 + :0145 = :0102. Therefore, even if a woman moves from having zero to one child, the marginal impact is still positive.
Because we do not know a priori the reach of social networks, we present evidence for network e ects using both contact availability at the PUMA level and at the MSA level. In all six cases, our measure of network e ects is positive and signi cant.
Columns 1 and 2 present estimates of network e ects when we measure contact availability at the PUMA level. The rst column shows that the coe cient on the interaction term is highly signi cant for the OLS regression. In column 2 we instrument the interaction term at the PUMA level with the interaction term at the MSA level. We use this IV estimation to assess the alternative hypothesis that no network e ects exist and that di erential selection is the sole reason for nding a positive OLS coe cient. Under this alternative h ypothesis, the OLS estimate is positive because of selection within MSAs and selection between MSAs, whereas the IV is only biased due to selection between MSAs. Hence, under the alternative hypothesis, comparing the OLS to the IV estimate allows us to infer the relative magnitude of selection within MSAs to selection between MSAs.
When we make this comparison using our estimates in Table 4 , we nd that selection between MSAs would belarger than selection within MSAs. 36 Because it is much easier to move within MSAs than between MSAs, one would have expected the exact opposite. Hence, we take the small di erence between the OLS and IV estimate as evidence against the hypothesis that our results are completely driven by di erential selection.
Columns 3 and 4 replicate columns 1 and 2 but with the education dummies dropped. If the process governing di erential selection on unobservable characteristics is similar to the selection process for observable ones, then dropping important observables provides information about omitted variable bias. As columns 3 and 4 show, dropping observable characteristics the education dummies hardly a ects the estimated coe cient, alleviating worries about biases generated by di erential selection.
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In column 5 and 6, we give estimates for networks e ects when contact availability is measured as the MSA level. These estimates are not a ected by potential di erential selection within MSAs, but contact availability measured at the MSA level may bea more noisy measure of social networks than PUMA level contact availability. Also for these speci cations, we continue to 36 To understand this, consider the model under the alternative hypothesis of no network e ects. To simplify notation, we suppress the control variables. Each v ariable is the residual of the regression of that variable on all the suppressed controls. We denote the MSA level interaction term by NM and the PUMA level interaction term by NP . One can always decompose NP into a part that is explained by NM and an error term: NP = NM + such that E =0 and E NM =0. Under the alternative h ypothesis, welfare recipiency W is solely determined by an error term: W = ". The bias in the OLS estimate can be decomposed into a part ^ M that is due to di erential selection within MSAs and a part ^ P that is caused by di erential selection between MSAs: This indicates that self-selection between MSAs must be greater than self-selection within MSAs.
In Table 6 , we i n vestigate the e ects of dropping controls more thoroughly.
nd positive and signi cant network e ects.
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Column 6 replicates column 5 but without the education dummies. Again, the point estimate stays essentially the same.
This table establishes our three main ndings. First, we estimate positive and signi cant network e ects in welfare use column 1. Second, after instrumenting for contact availability with MSA level availability and comparing the IV and OLS coe cients, we nd it implausible that our results can be fully driven by di erential selection column 2. As we discussed, this procedure is valid under the null hypothesis of no network e ects. Third, dropping important controls education dummies does not change our coe cients columns 3, 4 and 6.
The coe cient is hard to interpret. To provide a measure of the magnitude of the network e ects, we perform two thought experiments. First, we ask what is the di erential e ect of increasing contact availability b y t wo standard deviations for a person from a low w elfare using language group compared to the e ect for a person from a high welfare using language group. Welfare use for a group one standard deviation below the mean is 2.3 and welfare use for a group one standard deviation above the mean is 9.3.
39
The standard deviation of contact availability within groups is 0.493; so for an of 0.175, the e ect is 2.493.093.175=.0161 for the person from the high welfare using group but only 2.493.023.175 = 0.0040 for the person from the low w elfare using group.
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The di erence, 0.0121, is 20.8 of welfare use. We report this number as the response to a shock in contact availability.
In the second though experiment, we ask how much network e ects would magnify a policy shock a ecting welfare participation. To incorporate welfare policies explicitly, w e add the variable to the model:
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The smaller coe cients on the MSA level regressions should not be interpreted as the coe cients dropping. Recall that these are two di erent right hand side variables.
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The population weighted standard deviation in welfare participation between language groups is 0.035. This di ers from the standard deviation reported in Table 1 , which is the individual standard deviation of welfare participation.
W e l f ijk = + C A jk W e l f k + X i + j + k + C A jk + " ijk 4
The variable is a measure of policies that in uence welfare participation. It is scaled such that a one percentage point increase in leads to a one percentage point increase in welfare participation in the absence of network e ects. However, the equilibrium increase in welfare participation exceeds the increase in because networks result in accelerator e ects which magnify the impact of the change. An increase in the policy variable raises W e l f k which in turn raises each individual's welfare probability through the network e ect, creating a feedback. This calculation takes the model literally in the sense that it assumes that the actual level of welfare participation directly determines the quality of one's contacts. A broader interpretation of the model is that welfare participation is just a good proxy for the quality of one's contacts. In this case, a policy that increases overall welfare participation may not change the average quality o f contacts and social networks may not multiply the response to the policy shock. We are grateful to a referee for pointing this out.
regressions.
These estimates may understate the total network e ects. Given the large numberofpositive omitted variable biases, we h a ve taken a conservative approach.
42
Many of the variables which serve as controls in our regressions may proxy for networks in their own right. For example, we control for both neighborhood and language group xed e ects, both of which m a y proxy for networks. 43 We ignore them because their impact likely includes other factors|personal characteristics|as well as networks. Moreover, we only consider networks operating between people speaking the same language at home. It is very reasonable to believe that non language-based networks also exist.
One should, therefore, keep in mind that our quantitative estimates do not capture all aspects of social networks.
Speci cation Checks
How sensitive are our results to functional form and sample choice? Table 5 examines the impact of changing the functional form assumptions.
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One might reasonably be concerned that details of our speci cation might potentially distort our results. For example, it might be the case that the true model is a probit. In this case, our network measure, an interaction term, might proxy for these higher order non-linear terms, generating spurious coe cients. We have already discussed this to some degree in our di s-in-di s estimation Table 3 . In Table 5 , we investigate this issue more thoroughly. In all speci cations, we continue to nd positive and signi cant network e ects, though the quantitative size of these estimates is sometimes smaller.
In row 1, we begin by replicating columns 1 and 5 from Table 4 for ease of comparison.
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The conservative methodology re ects our goal of investigating the existence of networks 0, rather than quantifying them. Convincingly demonstrating existence raises enough di culties that we defer precise quanti cation to later work. 43 In fact, as discussed in Section 2, previous work on networks has focused on exactly these e ects. 44 Not reported in this table, but available from the authors, are the e ects of adding other controls, such a s a quartic in age, a dummy for having at least one child under the age of 6, more education dummies, immigrant status, year of immigration and English knowledge controls. These do not alter the ndings either. Rows 2 and 3 estimate logit and probit models respectively. They do not include PUMA xed e ects, however, due to the computational complexity of estimating logits and probits with over a thousand xed e ects. Row 4 informs us that dropping PUMA xed e ects does not signi cantly change our results in the linear probability model and one might tentatively think that the same would betrue for the logit and probit speci cations. In both the MSA and PUMA estimations, the probit and logit models produce positive and signi cant coe cients.
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Rows 5 to 8 alter the network measures. Recall that we measure networks through the interaction of contact availability and mean welfare of one's language group. In row 5, we replace mean welfare by log of mean welfare in the interaction term. The coe cients remain positive and signi cant. In rows 6, 7 and 8, we alter the way w e measure contact availability. Recall that in the rest of the paper, we measure contact availability b y:
In row 6, we use instead C jk =A j L k =T as our measure. In other words, we use levels instead of logs.
Row 7 uses ln C jk
A j as the contact availability measure. This last measure is such that small language groups will always have small contact availability. Row 8 uses lnC jk , the log of the unadjusted number of people in an area-language cell, to measure the quantity of contacts. This allows to incorporate possibly changing returns to scale. All these changes in the way w e measure contact availability result in positive and signi cant estimates at both the PUMA and MSA levels.
Finally, whenever one uses the interaction of two terms to identify an e ect, concerns arise that, if either of the terms enters into the equation non-linearly, the missing higher order terms may generate an omitted variable bias. We investigate this directly by including a quartic in CA row 9.
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Again, the coe cients do not change.
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The marginal impact of these estimates, however, are smaller. 46 We do not try higher order terms in W e l f k because they would be absorbed by the language xed e ects.
The issue of functional form is a tricky one since one can never establish with certainty that some yet untried speci cation will not alter the ndings.
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What bolsters our con dence, however, is that in all the speci cations that we h a ve tried, the estimates of network e ects remain positive.
We now investigate the e ect of changing samples. Table 6 displays the coe cients on the estimated network e ects for di erent subsamples of our original data set. In Table 2 , we s a w that more than 55 of our sample were Spanish speakers, raising concerns that our results are driven completely by this one group. In row 2, we drop Spanish speakers and continue to nd our results.
The coe cient o n C A W e l f k , W e l f is actually bigger in this subsample. In Table 2 , we also saw that the Miao and Mon-Kmer had extremely high welfare recipiency. These outliers may also drive our results. Therefore, in row 3, we exclude the Miao and Mon-Kmer speakers from the regression. Again, we continue to nd positive and signi cant e ects.
By including all women between age 15 and 55, our usual sample draws from a wide band of ages. AFDC, however, is restricted to women with dependent children. Since women in childbearing ages are most likely to be eligible for this program, we examine di erent age groups. Row 4 includes only women between 15 and 35, and 5 includes only women between 15 and 45.
Lowering the threshold in this manner does not a ect the qualitative ndings. They are smaller for the 15-35 group, but essentially the same for the 15-45 group. In row 6, we raise the lower threshold and focus on women between 25 and 55. Again, we nd the same qualitative ndings, but the coe cients are larger. Rows 4, 5, and 6, therefore, show that while the network e ects are present in all age groups, they are slightly stronger for the older women.
We also vary the fertility and marital composition of our sample. Currently, we include all women in the relevant ages. In rows 7 and 8, we use all women with kids and single women with kids respectively. We nd that the e ect is larger for all women with children. On the other 47 Non-parametric methods such as maximum score estimator might be of some assistance here, but unfortunately, they do not seem practically possible in our case see Greene 1990, p. 659. hand, the e ect is smaller for single women with children. 48 
Impact of Removing Controls on Estimates
In Table 4 , we found that removing education dummies did not a ect our network e ect estimates.
If unobservable characteristics about individuals drove our results, one would expect that increasing the set of unobservable characteristics by treating observable characteristics as unobservable would have a large impact on the estimate of network e ects. Table 7 investigates this issue more carefully. We begin with a sparse regression which has only the contact availability measure, language xed e ects, and the interaction between CA and mean welfare of the language group in row 1. The coe cients in row 1 are higher in the PUMA speci cation and lower in the MSA speci cation than the corresponding coe cients in Table 4 . We then add PUMA xed e ects in row 2. We nd that adding PUMA xed e ects does indeed lower the coe cient in the PUMA-level regression. This is consistent with our discussion in Section 4.5, where we argued the importance of neighborhood xed e ects. In the MSA level regression, however, the addition of PUMA xed e ects actually raises the coe cient. In row 3, we add controls that are clearly exogenous: age, age squared, a white dummy, and a black dummy. The coe cient hardly changes. In row 4, we add education controls. Again, the coe cient decreases slightly. In row 5, we add the remaining controls: the number of children ever born, marital status dummies, a dummy for single motherhood and a dummy for whether a child is present at home. Because these controls are likely to bea function of network e ects themselves, it comes as no surprise that they lower the estimated coe cient. 49 Although these controls decrease the 48 One potential explanation for this is that knowledge about AFDC is more widespread than knowledge about other forms of assistance, e.g. Housing Assistance. For this reason, one might think that networks matter less since this information may already be known through other sources.
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Given that these controls are likely to be endogenous, why are they included as regressors? Their inclusion biases the results down. Consequently, their inclusion can at best strengthen our case, since they make it less likely that we nd network e ects. coe cient by more then the education and exogenous controls, the drop in the coe cient is not very dramatic. In conclusion, inclusion of the education controls and variables such as age, does not a ect the coe cient. On the other hand, inclusion of the potentially endogenous marital status, fertility, and single motherhood controls does change the coe cient.
Explicit Selection Equations
We have already discussed in Table 4 several of our techniques for dealing with omitted variable biases. In this section, we i n vestigate this issue by estimating explicit selection equations. Table 8 provides additional evidence against di erential selection of individuals into high and low contact availability areas depending on the mean welfare of their language group. We regress residential choice, as measured by the contact availability in the area, on a set of demographic characteristics and on the interaction of these demographics with mean welfare use of the language group. If the results were driven by di erential selection on unobservables that increase welfare use, the coe cient on the interaction term of the unobserved characteristics with mean welfare of the language group should bepositive. As unobservables are of course not available, we proceed as in Section 4.4 and instead use observed characteristics. This approach is valid if the selection on unobservables is governed by a similar mechanism as selection on observables.
Columns 2 and 4 estimate these equations without PUMA xed e ects. They show that in the absence of PUMA xed e ects, there would be di erential selection of the kind that could yield spurious estimates of network e ects. This highlights the importance of controlling for PUMA xed e ects, which w e do in all other speci cations. In contrast, the regressions in columns 1 and 3 estimate the selection equations with PUMA xed e ects. They show no pattern of selection consistent with omitted variable biases corrupting our estimates. In column 1, we nd a nonmonotonic relationship between education and selection. In column 3, which is at the MSA level, we nd a relationship between education and selection, but it is the exact opposite of the pattern one would expect if omitted variable biases corrupted our results. Less educated women are more likely to live in a high contact area if the mean welfare participation of their language group is low.
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In conclusion, the results in this section indicate that, if anything, sorting on observables seems to bias our coe cients in the wrong direction. However, sorting on unobservables might b e qualitatively di erent from sorting on observables so this does not completely rule out the possibility of di erential selection. 
Network Mechanisms
What are the mechanisms through which the networks operate? We h a ve so far demonstrated that conditional on marital status, fertility and single motherhood, networks in uence welfare use. In this section, we ask whether networks a ect these fertility and marital status decisions. To this end, in Table 9 , columns 1 and 2 use single motherhood as the dependent v ariable and columns 3 and 4 use a dummy for being married as the dependent v ariable.
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For the regressions with single motherhood, the coe cient on the interaction term is signi cant and positive, indicating a higher likelihood of being a single mother for women who have many contacts in a high welfare using language group. 53 Similarly, columns 3 and 4 show that these women have a signi cantly lower probability of being married. These results combined with the previous ones tell us that 50 That di erential selection should operate in this reverse way is puzzling, but the results seem robust. We h a ve estimated these regressions using continuous education variables, and further separating the high school dropout dummy i n to 4 more dummies. We also allowed other covariates to be interacted with the mean welfare. The ndings carry through in all these cases.
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The non-interacted coe cients are not reported but these indicate that there is signi cant selection on observables, but this selection is not di erential.
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The independent v ariable of interest remains C Ainteracted with mean welfare. One could imagine interacting C Awith the relevant c haracteristic, for example with mean single motherhood in column 1. We did not do this for two reasons. First, to maintain consistency and comparability. Second, we are investigating the e ects of a culture of poverty which w e measure with mean welfare use. 53 However, the quantitative impact of this channel is quite small. The coe cient on single motherhood in the original regression Table 4 , col. 1 is :1947. Our measure of the impact of networks on single motherhood is :0896 Table 9 , col. 1. Multiplying these together implies that the impact of networks as they operate through single motherhood is :0174. This is only a tenth of the total measured impact of networks, :1751 Table 4 , col 1. welfare networks operate through fertility and marital status decisions as well as by increasing the propensity to receive w elfare conditional on marital status and fertility.
In columns 5 and 6, we attempt to re ne our welfare measure. Currently it includes all forms of public assistance. This could include many t ypes of aid besides Aid to Families with Dependent Children. To turn our focus more towards AFDC since it is of the greatest policy importance, we construct a proxy for AFDC recipiency by i n teracting single motherhood with public assistance recipiency. We nd signi cant and positive network e ects on this proxy. The coe cient is smaller than our previous estimates, suggesting that part of earlier estimates of network e ects operate through welfare programs other than AFDC. However, the estimates of network e ects for just AFDC are still important and very signi cant. Table 10 analyzes the various determinants of the strength of network e ects. This serves two purposes. First, it o ers a reality check for our estimates. We have strong expectations about how some variables should a ect networks. Second, such a breakdown can provide interesting information about what catalyzes networks.
Distribution of E ects
In the rst row, we estimate how the strength of the network e ect varies with immigrant status and length of stay in the United States. 54 We nd that network e ects are signi cantly stronger for foreign-born women who have recently entered the United States. This foreign-born e ect tends to diminish with the numberof years since entry.
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Both these ndings are consistent with our intuition. First, newcomers are likely to bemore engaged with their ethnic group. Our measure of networks is better for newcomers since ethnicity plays a larger role in their friendship. Second, 54 The rst three rows also include a foreign born dummy, y ear of immigration dummies and knowledge of English dummies as controls. Moreover, in addition to a third order interaction term, each r o w also contains all relevant second order interaction terms. 55 In fact, at the average numberofyears since entry 13.3 years, there is about no di erence left in network e ects between foreign-born and US-born women. information about welfare provided by networks should be most important for newcomers to this country. They will be the ones who will know the least about the myriad welfare programs in the United States. Rows 2 and 3 analyze how the strength of network e ects varies with English knowledge. Row 2 studies whether networks are more important for individuals more uent in English.
We nd that network e ects are weaker for people speaking better English. Again, this matches intuition. Very interestingly, network e ects stay large for women who speak good or excellent English. The estimated coe cient on C A jk W e l f k , W e l f is two-thirds as large for women who speak good or excellent English as for women who do not. Network e ects based on language spoken at home seem to be strong even for individuals who are conversant in English. This likely re ects the fact that even uent English speakers prefer to associate with others who speak their native tongue.
Row 3 shows the e ect of the English uency of contacts.
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Two oppositing forces may be at play. On the one hand, increased English uency makes it more likely that potential contacts can help in navigating the welfare system, suggesting an increased network e ect. On the other hand, increased English uency of contacts may re ect the fact that these contacts are of higher quality". They may thus be less likely to provide information about welfare, and more likely to provide information about job opportunities. This e ect suggests a negative impact of mean English uency. Row 3 demonstrates a negative e ect, supporting this last story. Increased English uency of one's contacts reduces network e ects. 57 Finally, i n r o w 4 we i n vestigate how the strength of the network e ect varies with generosity 56 Mean English uency of contacts is de ned as the proportion of our sample in that language group and in that area who speak English either well or very well.
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One might be concerned by h o w small network e ects are when the mean English uency of a language group in an area is high. An implication of row 3 is indeed that there is no network e ects if all the members of a language group in an area speak good or excellent English. This last result raises the possibility of an alternative i n terpretation for our results based on a bureaucratic channel". We extensively address this concern in section 4.8.
of AFDC bene ts. We measure generosity as the maximum state annual bene ts for a household of three divided by the state mean annual manufacturing sector wage in 1990. Again, generosity can a ect networks either way. Increased generosity might make people more knowledgeable through sources other than networks. On the other hand, increased generosity may catalyze networks by making friends more eager to inform about welfare. We nd that network e ects strengthen with welfare generosity.
The Bureaucratic Channel
In the previous sections, we have attempted to deal with potential omitted variable biases in our regressions. Even in the absence of these biases, however, an alternative explanation potentially drives our results. The heavy concentration of a high welfare using language group in an area may lead the welfare o ce in that area to hire a social worker who speaks that language. Individuals in that language group and area will nd the administrative procedures to access welfare less burdensome and are thus more likely to participate. We refer to this as a bureaucratic channel".
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This channel also predicts a positive coe cient on the interaction term between contact availability and mean welfare use of a language group. We i n vestigate this possibility b y focusing on Spanish speakers and exploiting di erences in their country of origin. Suppose that, among the Spanish speakers, people that share the same country of origin are more likely to be in contact with each other. One can then estimate a regression similar to equation 3 but where CA and W e l f h are measured by country of origin rather than by language and where one replaces language group xed e ects by xed e ects for each country of origin h. We c hose Spanish speakers for two reasons. First, they are by far the biggest language group in our sample, and this becomes essential when looking within groups. Second, they have 58 We are grateful to Aaron Yelowitz for suggesting this alternative i n terpretation to us. a diverse background, with Spanish speakers hailing from many parts of the world. In contrast, many of the other language groups are extremely isolated geographically.
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Since country now proxies for contacts within Spanish speakers, the network e ects model continues to predict a positive and signi cant coe cient on the C A W e l f h term.
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The bureaucratic channel model, on the other hand, predicts no e ect. The relevant v ariables that determine whether a w elfare o ce will hire a social worker uent in Spanish are the concentration of Spanish speakers and the welfare proneness of the Spanish speakers in an area. Both of these variables|concentration of Spanish and mean welfare use of Spanish in an area|are constant within a local area and are thus fully captured by the area xed e ects. The use of country of origin for Spanish speakers thus allows us to distinguish between the two models.
The data used consists of women in the original data set who speak Spanish at home. We further restrict the sample to include only those whose ancestry is classi ed as hispanic by the Census and whose ancestry can be linked to a speci c country.
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These exclusions make the sample smaller than the set of all Spanish speakers. In the end, we are left with 24 di erent groups of hispanic origin and 202; 990 observations. Table 11 displays our results. Columns 1 and 2 are equivalent to columns 1 and 5 in Table   4 . The estimated coe cient on the interaction term C A W e l f h ,W e l f is positive and signi cant both at the PUMA level and the MSA level. As stated, this nding is consistent with network e ects, but harder to reconcile with the bureaucratic channel explanation because each regression in Table 11 includes PUMA xed e ects that capture the di erential accommodation of Spanish speakers between local welfare o ces. The magnitude of e ect estimated in these regressions are similar to the magnitudes computed for Table 4 . In conclusion, these results support networks and 59 For example, Gujarati speakers are by and large con ned to only one state in India.
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In other words, the availability of Spanish speaking contacts in one's local area that share the same country of origin increases welfare participation if individuals from that country are on average high welfare users. 61 We use the hispanic variable in the 1990 Census. For example, individuals that report Latin America as their hispanic origin are excluded from the sample since this is not a speci c country.
do not support a bureaucratic channel. They are also of independent i n terest because they use a di erent v ariable|country of origin|to implement the same methodology.
Conclusion
Evidence on the existence of network e ects is of great importance for both theory and policy.
Theorists in many elds are beginning to incorporate social networks into their models. Finding evidence of network e ects increases the practical relevance of such models. From a policy point o f view, optimal welfare policy can look very di erent in the presence of networks. Micro-estimates of the welfare participation response to an increase in bene ts can be too low since networks can increase elasticities through multiplier e ects. Similarly, the bene ts of job training and placement programs may extend beyond the individuals directly being helped. Evidence for network e ects also argue for the importance of housing reallocation and desegregation programs.
Empirical work, however, has found it di cult to distinguish networks from omitted variable bias. People with unobserved characteristics that increase welfare participation may disproportionately live in high welfare participation areas. Hence, the observation that neighborhoodwelfare participation rates are correlated with individual welfare participation may simply re ect omitted personal or neighborhoodcharacteristics rather than a causal relationship.
In this paper, we use information on language spoken at home to circumvent these identi cation problems. People tend to interact with others from their own language group. Hence, persons who live in areas with many of their own language group will have a larger poolofavailable contacts.
They are thus more likely to be in uenced by their language group. Rather than investigating the direct e ect of being surrounded by one's language group, we i n vestigate the di erential e ect. We ask: does increased contact availability raise welfare use more for individuals from high welfare language groups?
In support of network e ects, we nd evidence for this di erential e ect of contact availability.
We nd highly signi cant and positive coe cients on the interaction between contact availability and mean welfare participation of one's language group.
We h a ve used language to proxy for the structure of within neighborhood contacts. This technique has allowed us to deal with many of the standard biases in the existing literature. We have investigated the existence of other omitted variable biases. Our results show that social networks seem to strongly in uence welfare participation. 4 . Welfare" is a dummy v ariable that equals 1 if the woman receives public assistance. Child Present" is a dummy that equals 1 if the woman has some own children at home. Number of Kids" is the number of children ever born. Poor English" equals 1 for individuals who speak English not well" or not at all" and 0 for those who speak it well" or very well". Mother .1947 Mother . .1946 Mother . .1949 Mother . .1948 Mother . .1947 Mother . .1949 . Demographic controls include 4 education dummies, 6 marital status dummies, a white dummy, a black dummy, a quadratic in age, a dummy for single mother, a dummy for the presence of own children at home as well as a control for the number of kids ever born.
4. The Contact Availability C A measure used throughout the paper and in speci cation 1 is de ned as C A jk = ln C jk =Aj = L k =T where C jk is the number of people of language group k in area j, Aj is the number of people in area j, L k is the number of people in language group k, and T is the total number of people in the U.S. 5. Standard errors are in parentheses. They are corrected to allow for group e ects within PUMA-language cells 22543 cells or MSA-language cells 6197 cells, depending on which CA measure is used. Asterisks indicate signi cance levels: * is 10, ** is 5, *** is 1, **** is .1 The Contact Availability CA measures are de ned in detail in the text. 4. Demographic controls include 4 education dummies, 6 marital status dummies, a white dummy, a black dummy, a quadratic in age, a dummy for single mother, a dummy for the presence of own children at home as well as a control for the number of kids ever born. 5. Standard errors are in parentheses. They are corrected to allow for group e ects within PUMA-language cells 22543 cells or MSA-language cells 6197 cells, depending on which LGC measure is used. Asterisks indicate signi cance levels: * is 10, ** is 5, *** is 1, **** is .1 variables: 4 education dummies, 6 marital status dummies, a white dummy, a black dummy, a quadratic in age, a dummy for single mother, a dummy for the presence of own children at home as well as a control for the number of kids ever born. Language Fixed E ects are 42 language dummies. PUMA Fixed E ects are 1196 dummies for the PUMAs represented in the sample. 5. Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate signi cance levels: * is 10, ** is 5, *** is 1, **** is .1 Single Mother is a dummy v ariable that equals 1 for single mothers and Married is a dummy v ariable that equals 1 for married women. The Contact Availability CA measures are de ned in detail in the text. The omitted education dummy is College and More". 3. Standard errors are in parentheses. They are corrected to allow for group e ects within PUMA-language cells 22543 cells or MSA-language cells 6197 cells, depending on which CA measure is used. Asterisks indicate signi cance levels: * is 10, ** is 5, *** is 1, **** is .1 4. Language Fixed E ects are 42 language dummies. PUMA Fixed E ects are 1196 dummies for the PUMAs represented in the sample. 5. Mean Welfare of LG" is expressed as a deviation from the sample mean over all language groups. 2. The Contact Availability CA measure is de ned as C A jh = ln C jh A j = L h T where C jh is the number of Spanish speakers from country of origin h in area j, Aj is the number of people in area j, L h is the numberof Spanish speakers from country of origin h, and T is the total number of people in the U.S.. The sample mean of C A jh is 1.90 at the PUMA level and 1.57 at the MSA level.
3. Mean Welfare of CG" is the mean welfare by country of origin. It is expressed in deviation from the sample mean. 4. Country of Origin Fixed E ects are 24 country of origin dummies. PUMA Fixed E ects are 1179 dummies for the PUMAs represented in the sample. 5. Welfare participation is a dummy v ariable that equals 1 if the individual receives any form of public assistance.
The omitted education dummy is College and More". The omitted marital status dummy is Married, Spouse Present". 6. Standard errors are in parentheses. They are corrected to allow for group e ects within PUMA-country of origin cells 9823 cells and MSA-country of origin cells 2549 cells, depending on which CA measure is used. Asterisks indicate signi cance levels: is 10, is 5, is 1, is .1. 7. The magnitude of e ect calculation is explained in the text.
